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"although the name is not appropriate, and which has for its object the investigation of juridical ideals and the laws of their realisation ; the other called juridical sociology, a name equally inappropriate but not easily improved, which has for its object the new studies upon the natural formation and evolution of juridical and political phenomena."

These volumes and others which have lately appeared in Italy illustrate a fact not well enough known in this country, and that is that Italian thought on sociological subjects is abreast of that in any other country. I. W. HOWERTH.

THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. A Contribution to some Problems of Logic and Metaphysics. By *L. T. Hobhouse*, Fellow and Assistant-Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. London : Methuen & Co. 1896. Pages, xx, 627. Price, 21 shillings.

Mr. Hobhouse thinks the time has arrived for an attempt to fuse what is "true and valuable in the older English tradition" with the newer doctrines of Lotze and Hegel. We shall limit ourselves to giving our readers a general idea of the contents of the book, which we may say at once is deserving of careful study.

In his Introduction the author tells us what he understands by philosophy. This is a synthesis of the sciences—"of all that is known, and . . . of much also that is only felt or hoped." To this synthesis the theory of knowledge contributes only one element, that which concerns "the conditions of genuine knowledge and of certain broad aspects of the results or tendencies of knowledge which seem to be bound up with any just conception of its conditions." The subject is highly complex, and that the reader may have a guide to the line of thought pursued, the author begins his work by pointing out, that in regard to any statement whatever three questions may be asked—as to the grounds on which it is made, its meaning, and its truth—and that these questions deal respectively with the conditions, the contents, and the validity of our knowledge as a whole. The discussion of the subject follows these lines.

The work is divided into three parts, the first of which treats of the *Data* with which the theory of knowledge is concerned. Chapter I. deals with Apprehension, used in the sense of sensation or perception, which is the starting point of knowledge. Its content is fact, within which may be included space and time, as well as qualities and relations. Memory, and Construction, which appears first as "memory-synthesis," and is based on comparison operating by analysis or abstraction, engage attention in the next two chapters. The remainder of Part I. is devoted to a discussion of particular and general Ideas, Resemblance and Identity, and of the nature and different kinds of Judgment, which the author speaks of as the acceptance or assertion of an idea "involving a suggestion of, or reference to reality. In the chapter treating of "The Validity of Judgment" he considers the objections to categorical judgments. Here he concludes that space and time are not proved unreal by infinite divisibility or infinite extent. Part II. of Mr. Hobhouse's work deals

with the theory of Inference, under the heads of Imagination, Inference, Probable Reasoning and Induction. The chapters on Numerical Probability, Scientific Induction, The Interconnexion of General Truths, and Constructive Generalisation are of especial interest. Under the head of "Explanation" the author treats fully of the relation of cause and effect, which he describes as forming "one process or stream of existence passing before us." Classification has to do with general attributes and relations, as opposed to explanation, which is concerned with universal laws and their relations, and hence is the ideal of science.

The third part of this exhaustive work is concerned with the subjects of the Validity and Reality of Knowledge, and it deals with many important questions. Knowledge is declared to be valid as a system of judgments connected by valid methods, and the principle of validity itself is guaranteed by the system which it forms. In the chapter on External Reality the thing-in-itself receives attention, and the conclusion is arrived at that apprehension is of outer objects. The next chapter deals with Substance, and the subject is discussed under two heads, "that of the unity of various attributes in the thing, and that of the permanence of substance in the midst of qualitative changes." This leads to a consideration of the Conception of Self, which the author, distinguishing self from subject and from the ego, seems inclined to regard as the substantial whole to which consciousness belongs, although "the ultimate substance to which consciousness is referable remains doubtful." In his concluding chapters Mr. Hobhouse argues that Reality is an interconnected whole, probably organic, and he affirms that knowledge is relative only in the sense of being partial and inadequate, and that our conception of the whole grows constantly less inadequate. Careful consideration is given to the subject of variability, which is said to be "determined by the constructive necessities of the whole to which they belong." Finally, Logic is a hypothetical reconstruction of knowledge, and the function of Philosophy is declared to be the interpretation of reality by a synthesis of knowledge in which is included the "truth of feeling."

C. S. W.

DIE ENTWICKELUNG DER GEHIRNBAHNEN IN DER TIERREIHE. *L. Edinger*. "Allgemeine Medicinische Central-Zeitung," 1896, No's 79 and 80.

In this recent address before the Sixty-Eighth Assembly of German Naturalists and Physicians Professor Edinger has so concentrated our present knowledge of nerve-evolution that it would be impossible to crystallise in a short review all that is contained in his admirable and suggestive lecture. We may, however, call attention to two or three points on which Dr. Edinger lays special emphasis.

Although dealing principally with the nervous mechanism of vertebrates, he rightly claims that the operations of these complex structures cannot be understood without studying lower organisms. And to this work he strongly insists that the investigator shall bring no prejudices; that he shall apply no anthropopsychic units of measurement; that he shall not describe the wriggling of a worm nor the closing of